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Union gunboats firing from the Tennessee River, creating havoc for 
Confederates attacking the Union left. The late Grady McWhiney’s 
essay supports the long-held interpretation that Confederate General 
Beauregard would have won the battle had he not halted fighting to 
reorder his forces on the evening of the battle’s first day. Charles 
Grear’s well-presented chapter examines the battle from the personal 
perspective of ordinary Confederate participants and describes how 
the years following the battle changed perceptions. Brooks Simpson 
concludes the volume by evaluating how the battle influenced the re-
lationship between Generals Grant and Sherman, two of the nine-
teenth century’s most renowned leaders, in the subsequent years. 
 Despite the quality of the topics covered, this collection is not 
meant to offer comprehensive coverage of the battle. Those less famil-
iar with what Grant regarded as one of the most complicated and 
misunderstood battles of the war may be better served to begin with 
works such as Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862, edited by Timo-
thy Smith and Gary Joiner; Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War, 
by Larry Daniel; or Shiloh — Bloody April, by Wiley Sword. Those 
deeply versed in understanding the complex engagement, however, 
will find The Shiloh Campaign a well-presented complement to their 
understanding of the battle. 
 
 
Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, by William L. Shea. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. x, 358 pp. Illustrations, 
maps, appendixes, notes, bibliography, index. $35.00 cloth. 
Reviewer Richard F. Kehrberg lives in Ames, Iowa. His research and writing 
have focused on U.S. military history. 
On December 7, 1862, Union and Confederate forces fought a small 
but bloody battle on a wooded ridge in northwest Arkansas called 
Prairie Grove. The battle marked the culmination of a remarkable 
campaign, all the more remarkable since the Confederate cause in the 
Trans-Mississippi Theater seemed irrevocably lost in the spring of 
1862. After the Battle of Pea Ridge in March, Union forces operated 
with impunity in the state’s northern counties as the rest of Arkansas 
tottered on the brink of anarchy. Confederate fortunes rebounded dra-
matically, however, with the arrival of Thomas C. Hindman on May 31. 
Through a combination of administrative acumen, boundless energy, 
and ruthlessness, Hindman restored order in the troubled state and 
re-established a Confederate military presence north of the Arkansas 
River by August.  
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 Hindman was anxious to do more than restore order and rebuild 
an army. He wanted to march into Missouri. Not only would a Confed-
erate force in southwest Missouri gall the Federals and threaten Kansas, 
but it would also allow the Confederates to exploit the human and 
material resources of a new region and shield Arkansas and the Indian 
Territory from the Union Army. Hindman’s Confederates marched 
north in early September, but after several frustrating weeks of march-
ing, countermarching, and skirmishing, they found themselves back 
where they had started in early November. While sorting out the wreck-
age of his failed campaign, Hindman discerned an opportunity. The 
Union force facing Hindman consisted of three small divisions, one 
under Brigadier General James G. Blunt, a Kansas physician turned 
soldier, and two under Brigadier General Francis J. Herron, a for-
mer banker from Dubuque. Upon learning that the two Union forces 
were separated by some 120 miles, Hindman settled on an audacious 
plan to strike Blunt’s exposed division. Hindman pushed his tired, 
ragged army north, but not fast enough. Blunt learned of Hindman’s 
advance and called on Herron for aid. Herron responded by rapidly 
moving his men south, marching an average of 30 miles per day. Con-
vinced that Hindman would strike Blunt first, Herron was surprised 
when his force stumbled onto the Confederates at Prairie Grove. 
 Hindman, who had planned to be the attacker, assumed a defen-
sive position on the wooded slopes of Prairie Grove. Herron under-
estimated the force opposing him and launched an immediate attack. 
That action began a series of attacks and counterattacks that stretched 
over the course of the day without producing any lasting results. In 
the late afternoon, Blunt’s division appeared on the field but could 
not dislodge the Confederates either. Neither side gained a significant 
advantage during the day’s fighting, but after nightfall Hindman de-
cided to retire his battered army and retreat. The Confederacy in the 
Trans-Mississippi Theater never recovered from Prairie Grove. Never 
again would the Confederacy seriously attempt to regain Missouri or 
threaten Kansas. 
 Fields of Blood presents a thoroughly researched and engagingly 
written narrative of the Prairie Grove campaign. William Shea’s ability 
to illuminate the interconnections among strategy, logistics, and geog-
raphy is especially noteworthy. Students of Iowa’s Civil War contribu-
tion will find a good deal of interest in this volume. Both of Herron’s 
divisions contained Iowa regiments, and their voices form an impor-
tant part of Shea’s story. They also performed important roles in the 
battle. The Nineteenth Iowa Infantry, for example, played a conspicu-
ous part in Herron’s first assault on Prairie Grove and suffered an ap-
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palling 55 percent casualty rate as a result — the highest of any regi-
ment in the battle. Fields of Blood is an excellent study of an important 
but often overlooked campaign and is a welcome addition to the lit-
erature on the Trans-Mississippi Theater.  
 
 
The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783–
1900, by Robert Wooster. Histories of the American Frontier. Albuquer-
que: University of New Mexico Press, 2009. xvi, 361 pp. Illustrations, 
maps, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 cloth. 
Reviewer J. Thomas Murphy is associate professor of history at Bemidji State 
University. His dissertation (University of Illinois, 1993) was “Pistols Legacy: 
Sutlers, Post Traders, and the American Army, 1820–1895.” 
During congressional debates to determine army appropriations in 
1878, Montana’s territorial delegate, Martin Maginnis, spoke favorably 
of the U.S. Army’s contribution in advancing the nation westward, 
while U.S. Representative Auburn L. Pridemore of Virginia thought 
otherwise. “It has been the tiller of the soil,” countered the former 
Confederate soldier, “who stood with loaded gun in his own field who 
has made his way through the savage land” (274). Pridemore’s argu-
ment bore the memory of a Yankee army ruling over the South during 
Reconstruction, but it reflected other long-standing values: the Revolu-
tionary generation’s discomfort with maintaining a large standing 
army, the Jacksonian desire for a limited government, and the Ameri-
can belief in self-reliance and individual opportunity. Such ideas min-
imized a federal role, and the dispute appeared time and again, yet as 
Robert Wooster makes clear, the army became the “government’s most 
visible agent of empire” (xii). Militias and state-sponsored volunteers 
contributed to American expansion, fighting at Tippecanoe with Wil-
liam Henry Harrison in 1811 and following Alexander Doniphan into 
Mexico in 1847, but despite a parsimonious Congress and a tradition 
limiting the army’s numbers, primary responsibility fell to regulars led 
by officers trained at West Point. 
 This imperial thesis is hardly new, having been established a gen-
eration ago by Robert G. Athearn, Francis Paul Prucha, and Robert Ut-
ley, but recent historians have continued to refine it, and this volume 
employs a remarkable depth of scholarship and primary sources to de-
scribe the army’s role from the earliest days of the nation to the end of 
the nineteenth century. During that time, soldiers explored and mapped 
the West, built forts and roads, protected the borders and “participated 
in over eleven hundred combat operations against Indians” (273).  
